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codified this constitutional require-
ment in laws specifically designating 
the defendant's age as a mitigating 
factor in capital cases. Moreover, the 
determinations required by juvenile 
transfer statutes to certify a juvenile 
for trial as an adult ensure individu-
alized consideration of the maturity 
and moral responsibility of sixteen 
and seventeen year-old offenders be-
fore they are even held to stand trial 
as adults. 
[d. at 2978. 
Similarly, the Court rejected Stan-
ford's reliance on public opinion polls, 
the views of public interest groups and 
the poSitions of professional associations 
as indicia of a national consensus, declar-
ing them insufficient foundations on 
which to rest constitutional law. "A ... 
national consensus so broad, so clear 
and so enduring as to justify a permanent 
prohibition upon all units of democratic 
government must appear in the opera-
tive acts (laws and application of laws) 
that the people have approved." [d. at 
2979. 
Finally, the Court deemed it unneces-
sary to conduct a proportionality test: to . 
examine whether "there is a dispropor-
tion between the punishment imposed 
and the defendant's blameworthiness." 
[d. at 2980. This test is used only where 
there is objective evidence of a societal 
consensus against the penalty; no such 
evidence existed in this case. [d. 
In a strong dissent, Justice Brennan 
criticized the Court's reliance on legisla-
tive enactments to determine that the 
capital punishment of sixteen or seven-
teen year old offenders did not offend 
'''evolving standards of decency ... · [d. at 
2982 (quoting Trop v. Dulles) This ap-
proach returned to the task of defining 
eighth amendment protection to the very 
political majorities the framers sought to 
deny such power. '''One's right to life, 
liberty, and property, . . . and other 
fundamental rights may not be submit-
ted to vote; they depend on the outcome 
of no elections.'" [d. at 2987 (quoting 
West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 
319U.S. 624, 638 (1943)). Furthermore, 
the dissent indicated that the plurality's 
discussion of state laws was distorted 
since it failed to account for the fifteen 
states (and the District of Columbia) 
which do not authorize capital punish-
ment at all. [d. at 2982-83. 
Justice Brennan also characterized the 
Court's review of legislative enactments 
to establish a national consensus as in-
complete. He argued that the rare appli-
cation of the death sentence for youthful 
offenders, the decisions of respected 
organizations in relevant fields that the 
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penalty was unacceptable, and its rejec-
tion by governments around the world, 
were strong indications that the execu-
tion of adolescents violated contempo-
rary standards of decency and should 
have been included in the Court's 
analysis. [d. at 2984-85. 
The dissent criticized the plurality's 
refusal to conduct proportionality analy-
sis. "There can be no doubt at this point 
in our constitutional history that the 
eighth amendment forbids punishment 
that is wholly disproportionate to the 
blameworthiness of the offender." [d. at 
2987. The dissent noted that in American 
society, juveniles are treated differently 
from adults. As a class, they do not have 
the level of maturation and responsibility 
presumed in adults. "'The reasons why 
juveniles are not trusted with the privi-
leges and responsibilities of an adult also 
explain why their irresponsible conduct 
is not as morally reprehensible as that of 
an adult. .. • [d. at 2988 (quoting 7bomp-
sonv. Oklahoma, 487 U.S._, 108S.Ct, 
2687,2699 (1988)). In Brennan's view, 
"[j]uveniles very generally lack that de-
gree of blameworthiness that is ... a con-
stitutional prerequisite for the imposi-
tion of capital punishment under our 
precedents concerning the eighth 
amendment proportionality principle." 
[d. at 2992. 
In a plurality opinion, the United 
States Supreme Court ruled that the im-
position of the death penalty on offend-
ers who were sixteen or seventeen years 
old at the time they committed their 
crimes did not violate the eighth amend-
ment's prohibition against cruel and 
unusual punishment, because such pen-
alty was not considered cruel and un-
usual at the time the Bill of Rights was 
adopted, and no national consensus 
against the execution of such youthful 
offenders had been established. 
-Mary Jo Murphy 
Gray v. State: COURT UPHELD 
TRlALJUDGE'S DISCRETION IN 
REFUSING TO REQUIRE A 
PROSECUTOR TO TESTIFY OR BE 
CROSS-EXAMINED FOR ALLEGED 
DISCRIMINATION IN SELECTING 
JURORS 
In Gray v. State, 317 Md. 250, 562 A.2d 
1278 (1989), the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland held that a prosecutor is not 
required to testify under oath or be sub-
jected to cross-examination when offer-
ing non-discriminatory explanations for 
the striking of black venire persons from 
the jury panel. 
Isaac Gray, a black male, \!las tried in 
the Circuit Court for Howard County for 
the first degree rape of a white woman. 
Upon completion of the jury selection 
process, Gray moved for a mistrial, alleg-
ing that since the prosecutor had used 
four of his peremptory challenges to 
strike black jurors from the panel, the 
state must advance an explanation for 
these challenges. [d. at 252-53, 562 A.2d 
at 1279. Relying on Swain v. Alabama, 
380 U.S. 202 (1965), the trial judge held 
that a prosecutor was not required to 
give explanations for the exercise of per-
emptory challenges. Gray, 317 Md. at 
253 n.2, 562 A.2d at 1279 n.2. Despite 
the court's ruling, the prosecutor volun-
teered a non-discriminatory reason for 
one of his strikes and noted that the jury, 
as impaneled, included one black juror 
and one black alternate juror. [d. at 253, 
562 A.2d at 1280. The trial judge denied 
the defendant's motion and Gray was 
subsequently convicted. 
Gray filed a motion for a new trial. At 
the hearing, Gray argued that Batson v. 
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), decided 
after Gray's trial on the merits, was appli-
cable to the facts of his case. Gray, 317 
Md. at 253, 562 A.2d at 1280. Batson 
held that where the totality of the circum-
stances surrounding a prosecutor's exer-
cise of peremptory challenges estab-
lished a prima facie case of racial discrimi-
nation, the burden was on the state to 
justify the challenges with a non-dis-
criminatory explanation. Gray argued 
that a prima facie showing had been 
established and, therefore, the state was 
required to provide a racially neutral rea-
son for the challenge. The prosecutor 
denied the allegations of discrimination 
and stated his reasons for striking each of 
the black jurors. The trial judge denied 
the motion for a new trial, based on his 
belief that Batson was not meant to be 
applied retroactively, and that, not-
withstanding Batson, the ratio of black 
jurors to the other jurors exceeded the 
ratio of blacks to all persons living in the 
county at that time. [d. at 253-54, 562 
A.2d at 1280. 
On appeal, the court of special appeals 
vacated the judgment and remanded the 
case for a determination of whether Gray 
had established a prima facie showing of 
racial discrimination, and, if so, whether 
the state had sufficiently rebutted the 
showing, in accord with the two-part test 
of Batson. [d. at 254,562 A.2d at 1280. At 
this hearing, counsel for the defendant 
requested, pursuant to a witness sub-
poena which had been served on the 
prosecutor, that the prosecutor be 
placed under oath before giving his rea-
sons for his jury strikes and that while 
under oath, he be subject to cross-exami-
nation. Gray argued that there was a 
guaranteed right to an adversarial hear-
ing under the principles of due process, 
equal protection and effective assistance 
of counsel. Id. The prosecution replied 
that the purpose of the hearing was to 
permit the state to explain its use of the 
challenges and that under these circum-
stances it was not necessary to require an 
oath or cross-examination. The trial 
judge agreed and quashed the subpoena. 
Id. 
The trial judge ruled that no prima 
facie case of racial discrimination had 
been established. Id. In the interest of 
prudence, however, the court addressed 
the second step of the Batson test (that 
the state must proffer a non-discrimina-
tory explanation for the exercise of the 
challenge) and found the prosecutor's 
explanation would have been sufficient if 
a prima facie showing had been made. Id. 
Gray again appealed, and this time the 
court of special appeals upheld the lower 
court, finding that Gray had not shown 
that the ruling of the trial court had been 
clearly erroneous. Gray petitioned the 
court of appeals for certiorari, raising 
two issues: 1) whether "[t]he trial court 
erred in ruling that the defense failed to 
establish a prima facie showing of racial 
discrimination in the prosecutor's exer-
cise of peremptory challenges"; and 2) 
whether "[t]he trial court erred in refus-
ing to require the prosecutor to testify 
under oath and be subject to cross-
examination." Id. at 255, 562 A.2d at 
1281. 
Initially, the Court of Appeals of Mary-
land assumed that the defendants had 
established a prima facie case of racial 
discrimination and, therefore, moved 
directly to the second issue: whether the 
prosecutor should be required to testify 
under oath and be subject to cross-
examination. /d. at 256, 562 A.2d at 
1281. The court noted that in Batson the 
Supreme Court refused to specify proce-
dures to be followed when a defendant 
objected to a prosecutor's challenges. Id. 
at 256-57, 562A.2dat 1281. The majority 
of courts that have faced the issue, how-
ever, left the procedure to the trial 
judge's discretion. The Gray court 
deemed this to be the better view, espe-
cially in light of the broad variety of 
circumstances under which a prosecutor 
may be required to offer an explanation 
and that the trial judge is to be accorded 
broad discretion in conducting a trial. Id. 
The court noted, however, one limita-
tion on the discretion of the trial judge: 
only a "compelling justification" would 
justify an ex parte proceeding sufficient 
to meet the dictates of Batson; under 
"normal" circumstances an adversary 
proceeding should be utilized to 
consider Batson challenges. Id. at 257-
58,562 A.2d at 1282. 
The court held the justifications of-
fered by the defense in support of ad-
ministration of an oath to the prosecutor 
were insufficient to remove the decision 
from the discretion of the trial judge. All 
attorneys are officers of the court, bound 
by Maryland Lawyers' Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct and "[a] trial judge call-
ing upon the prosecutor to explain his 
challenges has every right to expect total 
candor without resorting to the admini-
stration of an oath." Id. at 258, 562 A.2d 
at 1282. 
Examining the defendant'S right to 
cross-examine the prosecutor, the court 
noted "[i]n our adversary system of jus-
tice, cross-examination enjoys an exalted 
position." Id. at 258-59, 562A.2d at 1282. 
The court held that a judge faced with a 
request for a cross-examination in a Bat-
son situation has the discretion to grant 
the request, but only after a careful 
weighing of all the relevant factors in that 
particular case. Id. at 259, 562 A.2d at 
1282. The court, however, made clear 
that the favored procedure under these 
circumstances is not a formal adversary 
proceeding but rather a relatively infor-
mal proceeding similar to that which 
occurs during the voir dire examination 
of a juror at the bench. Id. 
Finally, the court opined that in a post-
trial hearing, as opposed to a hearing at 
the trial level, factors such as the passage 
of time and impairment of memory may 
require an explanation under oath and 
cross-examination.Id. at261, 562A.2dat 
1284. On the facts before the court, 
however, the court held that the actions 
of the trial court did not amount to an 
abuse of discretion. Id. 
The decision of the court of appeals in 
Gray has left the door open for trial 
judges to use the formalities and addi-
tional safeguards afforded by a formal 
adversarial proceeding when it is faced 
with a Batson allegation of discrimina-
tion in the selection of a jury. More 
importantly, the Gray decision pre-
serves the discretionary power of the 
trial judge to determine the proceeding 
that is best suited to the circumstances of 
the particular case before the court. 
-Greg Swain 
Baltimore Sun Co. v. Goetz: PRESS 
HAS COMMON lAW RIGHT OF 
ACCESS TO AFFIDAVIT 
SUPPORTING SEARCH WARRANTS 
BETWEEN EXECUTION OF 
WARRANTS AND INDICTMENT 
In Baltimore Sun Co. v. Goetz, 886 
F.2d60 (4th Cir. 1989), the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
held that the press's common law right of 
access to a sealed affidavit supporting 
search warrants during the interval be-
tween execution of the warrants and in-
dictment was within the sound discre-
tion of the judicial officer. As a result, in 
certain circumstances, the press may 
force the government to unseal warrant 
papers which could expose continuing 
criminal investigations. 
On January 27, 1988, a federal magis-
trate issued three search warrants based 
on the affidavit of an FBI agent,.and then 
sealed the papers. After execution ofthe 
warrants, the magistrate unsealed the 
warrants and the returns, but left the af-
fidavit sealed. On May 4, 1988, the Balti-
more Sun Company (Sun) petitioned to 
unseal the affidavit. However, the magis-
trate denied the Sun's petition conclud-
ing that the public interest in the investi-
gation of crime would not be best served 
by allowing the Sun to publish the affida-
vit. The Sun then sought a writ of manda-
mus from the United States District 
Court for the District of Maryland to com-
pel the magistrate to unseal the affidavit. 
The government offered to disclose a re-
dacted version of the affidavit, but the dis-
trict court declined. Without examining 
the affidavit, the district court agreed 
with the magistrate's conclusion and 
denied the Sun's petition. However, 
while the Sun's appeal of the district 
court's decision was pending, the magis-
trate unsealed the affidavit after indict-
ments were returned. 
After deciding that the affidavit was a 
judicial record, the court noted the supe-
rior distinction between the first 
amendment and common law rights of 
access. Only upon a showing of a 
"compelling government interest" and 
proofthat the denialis "narrowly tailored 
to serve that interest" maya court deny 
the first amendment right of access. Id. at 
64 (quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. 
Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 606 
(1982». On the other hand, a court may 
at its discretion deny the common law 
right to access. Id. 
The court began its analysis with the 
question of whether the Sun had a first 
amendment right of access to the affida-
vit. The court noted that the test for 
making such a determination is: "I) 
'whether the place and process have his-
torically been open to the press and 
general public,' and 2) 'whether public 
access plays a significant positive role in 
the functioning of the particular process 
in question.'" Id. (quoting Press-Enter-
prise v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1,8-10 
(1986». The court held that the Sun's 
claim failed the first prong of the test 
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